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Abstract
A crucial issue in non-cooperative wireless networks is that of sharing the cost of multicast transmissions to different users
residing at the stations of the network. Each station acts as a selﬁsh agent that may misreport its utility (i.e., the maximum cost it
is willing to incur to receive the service, in terms of power consumption) in order to maximize its individual welfare, deﬁned as
the difference between its true utility and its charged cost. A provider can discourage such deceptions by using a strategyproof cost
sharing mechanism, that is a particular public algorithm that, by forcing the agents to truthfully reveal their utility, starting from the
reported utilities, decides who gets the service (the receivers) and at what price. A mechanism is said budget balanced (BB) if the
receivers pay exactly the (possibly minimum) cost of the transmission, and -approximate budget balanced (-BB) if the total cost
charged to the receivers covers the overall cost and is at most  times the optimal one, while it is efﬁcient if it maximizes the sum
of the receivers’ utilities minus the total cost over all receivers’ sets. In this paper, we ﬁrst investigate cost sharing strategyproof
mechanisms for symmetric wireless networks, in which the powers necessary for exchanging messages between stations may be
arbitrary and we provide mechanisms that are either efﬁcient or BB when the power assignments are induced by a ﬁxed universal
spanning tree, or (3 ln(k+ 1))-BB (k is the number of receivers), otherwise. Then we consider the case in which the stations lay in a
d-dimensional Euclidean space and the powers fall as 1/d, and provide strategyproof mechanisms that are either 1-BB or efﬁcient
for = 1 or d = 1. Finally, we show the existence of 2(3d − 1)-BB strategyproof mechanisms in any d-dimensional space for every
d. For the special case of d = 2 such a result can be improved to achieve 12-BB mechanisms.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Wireless networks have received signiﬁcant attention during the recent years. In particular, ad hoc wireless networks
can be deployed for applications such as emergency disaster relief, automated battleﬁeld applications, etc. [45,50].
Unlike traditional wired networks or cellular networks, they do not require the installation of any wired backbone
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infrastructure. Each station of the network has a ﬁxed position and is equipped with an omnidirectional antenna which
is responsible for sending and receiving signals.
Wireless network model: a wireless network is usually modeled as a complete graph (S, c), called the cost graph, in
which S = {x1, . . . , xn} is a set of radio stations and c is a transmission cost function that associates to each ordered pair
of stations xi, xj the power required to establish a connection between them. Throughout the paper we will deal with
symmetric transmission cost functionswhich is themost adopted case in the literature.Asymmetric functions are usually
used to model medium abnormalities or batteries with different energy levels [35]. A power assignment  : S → R+
to all stations implements a connection from xi to xj if (xi)c(xi, xj ). Therefore, once a power assignment  is
ﬁxed, a weighted transmission digraph G = (S,E) can be abstracted, where E = {〈xi, xj 〉 | (xi)c(xi, xj )}
is the set of the connections implemented by . A communication session from xi to xj can be achieved directly (i.e.,
through a single-hop transmission) if (xi, xj ) ∈ E, or through relaying by intermediate stations, otherwise. The cost
of a power assignment  is the overall power consumption yielded by , i.e., cost () =∑xi∈S (xi).
The most common power attenuation model [45] assumes Euclidean wireless networks where the stations are located
in the d-dimensional Euclidean space (d1). In such a special case, the signal power of a station xi falls as 1/d, where
d is the distance from xi and 1 is a constant called the distance-power gradient (or attenuation parameter) depending
on the environmental conditions, whose typical values are between 1 and 6. All receivers have the same transmission-
quality threshold  for signal detection (typically normalized to be 1). As a consequence, the power required to establish
a connection between two stations xi and xj at distance dist (xi, xj ) is c,(xi, xj ) =  · dist (xi, xj ).
A crucial issue in wireless networks is that of supporting communication patterns that are typical of traditional
networks, such as multicasting (one-to-many communication), in which a message or service of a given source station
must be forwarded to users residing at a subset of receiving stations.
The problem of determining an optimal power assignment implementing a multicast tree rooted at a source s and
spanning a given set of receivers R, called the minimum energy multicast tree (MEMT) problem, is an interesting
algorithmic issue. In fact, such a tree guarantees the multicast communication from the source s to the users in R with
a minimum overall power consumption. However, it has been proved to be inapproximable within (1 − ) ln n unless
NP ⊆ DTIME(nO(log log n)) [11,49]. Caragiannis et al. [9] used a reduction to the well-known minimum node weighted
steiner tree (NWST) problem to prove that a -approximate solution obtained by using the reduction to NWST can
be used to obtain a 2 approximate solution to MEMT. The two best known approximation algorithms for NWST,
presented by Guha and Khuller in [28] and achieving performance guarantees of 1.35 ln k and 1.5 ln k (k is the number
of receivers), imply the existence of a 2.7 ln(|R|+1) and a simpler 3 ln(|R|+1) approximation algorithms for MEMT.
In Euclidean wireless networks, it has been proved in [11] that the problem of broadcasting (and hence multicasting)
with minimum energy consumption, called the minimum energy broadcast tree (MEBT) problem is NP-hard for  > 1
and d > 1 but solvable in polynomial-time if  = 1. Polynomial-time solvability of the case d = 1, already conjectured
in [11], was proved independently in [8,12]. The best known approximation algorithm, called MST, has been presented
with other heuristics in [50] and is based on the idea of tuning powers so as to include a minimum spanning tree of
the cost graph. The performance of MST has been investigated by several authors [11,49,21] and the evaluation of its
approximation ratio progressively reduced till 3d − 1 for every d [21]. For the case d = 2, this bound has been
recently improved to 6.33 in [39] and ﬁnally to 6 in [1].
Other results, also related to different communication patterns and connectivity requirements have been considered
also in [4,6,7,14,32] (see [13] for a survey).
Multicasting data to a large population is likely to incur signiﬁcant costs, expressed as the overall power consumption,
that is natural to be shared in some manner among the receivers.
We consider the problem of sharing the cost of multicast transmissions in symmetric wireless networks in a non-
cooperative scenario, where each station xi acts as a selﬁsh agent. In such a scenario, each agent is potentially
interested in receiving the service and valuates the transmission an amount ui , called the utility, interpretable as the
maximum cost (in terms of power consumption) that a station is willing to incur in order to receive the service from
the source. Each agent is only interested in maximizing its individual welfare i = ui − ci , that is the difference
between the utility and the cost share, and will agree to pay for the transmission if and only if it is charged a cost
not exceeding the utility. As the utility ui is not a property of the network (it is a “private” value of xi), each agent
xi may report a different value vi 	= ui trying to receive the transmission at a lower cost share, in order to increase
its individual welfare. The network can discourage such deceptions by using the so-called strategyproof cost sharing
mechanisms.
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A cost sharing mechanism is a (public) algorithm which, given any reported utility proﬁle u, decides the subset R(u)
of the agents receiving the service and shares the possibly minimum global cost C(R(u)) incurred by the source among
them, according to some method.
A cost sharing mechanism is strategyproof if truthfully reporting the utilities is always a dominant strategy for
each agent; that is, no agent has an incentive in reporting vi 	= ui , no matter how the other agents behave, as ui
maximizes its individual welfare wi(u) = vi − ci(u), where ci(u) is its cost share. More precisely, for a strategyproof
mechanism, denoted v−i = (v1, . . . , vi−1, vi+1, . . . , vn) and (v−i , ai) = (v1, . . . , vi−1, ai, vi+1, . . . , vn):
∀xi ∀v−i ∀vi 	= ui : wi(v−i , ui)wi(v−i , vi).
Group strategyproofness is a stronger form of strategyproofness, such that no coalition Q of agents has an incentive
to jointly misreport its utility values: for any Q and for any utility proﬁle v with vi = ui for every xi /∈ Q, the group
strategyproofness requires that if the inequality wi(v)wi(u) holds for all xi ∈ Q, then it must hold with equality for
all xi ∈ Q. In other words, if no member of Q is made worse off by misreporting their utility values, then no member
is made better off either.
In this work we are interested in deﬁning suitable (group) strategyproof mechanisms for sharing the costs of multicast
transmission services in wireless networks. More precisely, given any reported utility proﬁle u and a source s, such a
mechanism has to determine:
• the subset R(u) ⊆ S\{s} of the receivers;
• a power assignmentR(u) multicasting toR(u); i.e.,R(u) has to induce a transmission digraphGR(u) = (S,ER(u) )
that contains a multicast tree T (R(u)) rooted at s and spanning R(u) as a subgraph;
• in order to share the (possibly minimum) overall cost C(R(u)) = cost (R(u)) of the multicast service among the
receivers, a cost share ci(u), ∀xi ∈ R(u), representing the amount of power consumption attributed to each of them.
In order tomeet a fewnatural economical requirements, a cost sharingmechanism should also satisfy these requirements,
for every utility proﬁle u and for every agent xi :
• No positive transfers (NPT): ci(u)0.
• Voluntary participation (VP): wi(u)0, i.e., agents may decide not to receive the service and in such a case they
are not charged.
• Consumer sovereignty (CS): ∃vi : xi ∈ R(u−i , vi), i.e., every agent is guaranteed to get the service if it reports a
high enough utility value.
• Budget balance (BB): the selected agents inR(u) pay exactly the total cost of the service. Namely, it consists in satis-
fying both the two following requirements: (i)∑xi∈R(u) ci(u)C(R(u)) (cost recovery), and (ii)∑xi∈R(u) ci(u)
C(R(u)) (competitiveness).
• Efﬁciency: Let us say a subset R is efﬁcient if it maximizes the overall welfare W(R) = uR − C(R), where
uR = ∑xi∈R ui ; then the efﬁciency requirement consists in maximizing the net worth NW(u) = W(R(u)). Thus,
R(u) is an efﬁcient set.
Since in wireless networks energy is a scarce resource and establishing a communication pattern strongly depends on
the energy consumption, a natural question to be solved is to guarantee a communication with a minimum total energy
consumption.
We say that a mechanism satisﬁes the cost optimality (CO) requirement if it guarantees the overall cost C(R(u)) is
minimized. For NP-hard problems the CO requirement is not computationally feasible (unless P = NP) so, by denoting
with C∗(R) the minimum cost of serving R, in [29] the standard CO, BB and efﬁciency requirements are naturally
relaxed to:
• -approximate CO (-CO): C(R(u)) · C∗(R(u));
• -approximate BB (-BB): It consists in satisfying both the cost recovery requirement and ∑xi∈R(u) ci(u)·
C∗(R(u)) (-approximate competitiveness), i.e., the receivers pay at most  times the minimum cost. Clearly, -CO
and BB imply -BB. A 1-BB mechanism is optimally BB;
• -approximate efﬁciency (-efﬁciency):  · NW(u) maxR⊆S\{s} W(R).
There is a vast literature on the design of cost sharing mechanisms for several non-cooperative games [5,23,24,31,30].
One of the main approaches that have been considered in the literature in order to cope with agents’ selﬁshness is that of
mechanism design [40–42], that dates back to the seminal papers by Vickrey [48], Clarke [10] and Groves [27]. Their
celebrated VCG mechanism is still a fundamental technique to derive strategyproof mechanisms for many problems.
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In Section 1.1, we review the basics of algorithmic mechanism design and address related works on cost sharing
mechanisms for multicast transmissions on “classic” wired networks [2,17–19,29]. For a more extensive discussion of
applications of game theoretic tools and microeconomics to the Internet we refer the reader to [3,19,20,40–42]. Readers
already familiar with this area should skip Section 1.1.
1.1. Cost sharing mechanisms for non-cooperative games
The literature [25,46] on strategyproof cost sharing mechanisms emphasizes the tradeoff between efﬁciency and
budget balance: a strategyproof mechanism which satisﬁes NPT, VP and CS cannot be both efﬁcient and budget
balanced (BB). In view of this limitation, there are two options: sacriﬁce either budget balance or efﬁciency.
The marginal cost (MC) mechanism: When the cost function C is non-decreasing and submodular, i.e., C(∅) = 0
and ∀R,Q ⊆ S\{s}:
Q ⊆ R ⇒ C(Q)C(R), (1)
C(Q ∪ R)C(Q) + C(R) − C(Q ∩ R), (2)
then the only strategyproof mechanism which is efﬁcient is the MC mechanism [38], which is a special case of the
general class of the VCG strategyproof mechanisms [10,26,27,48]. The MC mechanism is strategyproof and meets
NPT, VP, CS; conversely, any strategyproof mechanism M selecting an efﬁcient set (not necessarily the largest) at
all utility proﬁles u, meeting NPT and VP is welfare equivalent to MC. However, MC it is not group strategyproof.
Moreover, it never creates a budget surplus, but can run a deﬁcit and in many cases it raises no revenue at all.
More precisely, as a consequence of the submodularity of C, since the union of two efﬁcient sets is also an efﬁcient
set, the largest one R∗(u) is well deﬁned. This allows to deﬁne the MC mechanism as follows: ﬁrst, select the largest
efﬁcient set R∗(u) of agents; then, ∀xi ∈ R∗(u), assign a MC
ci(u) = C(R∗(u)) − C((R\{xi})∗(u)). (3)
The Shapley value mechanism: A cost sharing method for a cost function C is a function  which distributes
C(R) among the receivers in such a way that ∀xi /∈ R, (R, xi) = 0 and ∑xi∈R (R, xi) = C(R). A method  is
cross-monotonic if ∀Q,R ⊆ S\{s} such that Q ⊆ R, (Q, xi)(R, xi) for every xi ∈ Q, whereas it is weakly
cross-monotonic if under the same assumption,
∑
xi∈Q (Q, xi)
∑
xi∈Q (R, xi).
When sacriﬁcing the efﬁciency requirement, as shown in [37,38], if a cross-monotonic method  exists for C, then
the following mechanism M() is BB, meets NPT, VP, CS and is group strategyproof (the converse also holds if the
cost function C is submodular):
• initialize R(u) to S\{s};
• while ∃xi ∈ R(u) : ui < (R(u), xi) drop xi from R(u);
• set ci(u) = (R(u), xi),∀xi ∈ R(u), and then build a feasible solution spanning R(u) of cost C(R(u)) =∑
xi∈R(u) ci(u).
Non-decreasing submodular cost functions support an entire class of cross-monotonic cost sharing methods, of which
the Shapley value [47] is one of the most relevant representatives, due to its fair distribution of costs and especially
because it achieves the lowest worst case efﬁciency loss over all the utility proﬁles [38]. The Shapley value [47] method
sets
(R, xi) = ∑
Q⊆R\{xi }
|Q|!(|R| − |Q| − 1)!
|R|! C(T (Q ∪ {xi})) − C(T (Q)). (4)
When specialized to the multicast problem in wireless networks, such a formula, a bit counterintuitive, has a quite
simple explanation (see Section 2.1).
ForNP-hard problems, Jain andVazirani in [29] have introduced the notion of approximate BB cost sharingmethod: a
method  is-approximate budget balanced (-BB), for some1, if∀R ⊆ S\{s},C(R)∑xi∈R (R, xi)·C∗(R).
The standard notions of cross-monotonic and weakly cross-monotonic cost sharing methods extend directly to -BB
cost sharing methods and  is said to be efﬁciently computable if ∀R ⊆ S\{s} both  and C(R) can be computed in
polynomial time. Extending the results in [37,38], in [29] it is proved that for any -BB cross-monotonic cost sharing
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method , the mechanism M() is -BB, meets NPT, VP, CS and is group strategyproof, and M() is efﬁciently
computable if  is.
The existence of cross-monotonic cost sharing methods for a cost function C can be related to the notion of core of
C, denoted core(C), deﬁned as the set of all the allocation functions f such that
∑
xi∈R f (xi)C(R), ∀R ⊆ S\{s}(i.e., no subset of agents has an incentive to secede). We recall that a cost allocation function f is a non-negative
function which distributes the cost of serving all the agents in S\{s} in such a way that ∀xi ∈ S\{s}, f (xi)0, and∑
xi∈S\{s} f (xi) = C(S\{s}). Since for every R a weakly cross-monotonic method deﬁnes an allocation function
belonging to the core for R, it follows that if the core of C is empty then no weakly cross-monotonic and thus cross-
monotonic method exists. As a further implication, since if C was submodular then the Shapley value would be a
cross-monotonic method, also C is not submodular.
The extendedMoulin–Shenker approach: The emptiness of the core prevents fromusing cross-monotonic cost sharing
methods to achieve BB group strategyproof mechanisms. Penna and Ventre in [44] recently extended the approach of
Moulin and Shenker and proposed a new technique to obtain group strategyproof BB mechanisms which also satisfy
NPT, VP and CS requirements by introducing the notion of self-cross-monotonic cost sharing and then showed that
group strategyproof mechanisms do not need to provide solutions in the core.
1.1.1. Cost sharing mechanisms for wired networks
The problem of sharing the cost of multicast transmissions in standard networks, where the cost is the total cost of
the links of a multicast subtree connecting the source s to the receivers R(u), has been considered by several authors
[17–19,29]. In [19] a method has been proposed in which a universal spanning tree is ﬁxed, and each multicast subtree
is given by the union of all the paths in the universal tree connecting s to the receivers. The deriving cost function is
non-decreasing and submodular, and thus Shapley value gives rise to a BB mechanism and the MC to an efﬁcient one,
both efﬁciently computable. Moreover, it is shown that the overall welfare value (sum of the utilities minus cost) of an
optimal subtree is NP-hard to approximate within any constant factor.
Nevertheless, the method of [19] has the drawback that the multicast trees may be arbitrarily more expensive than the
optimal ones, that is the minimum Steiner trees connecting s to the receivers. Of course, one of the problems is that such
a tree is NP-hard to compute. Moreover, even if polynomial solvability is not a concern, the results of Megiddo [36]
imply that there do not exist cross-monotonic cost sharing methods for minimum Steiner trees. Thus in [29], starting
from the classical approximation algorithm for the minimum Steiner tree problem based on the determination of a
minimum spanning tree (MST) of the subset of the receivers [34], using the primal-dual algorithm of Edmonds [16] a
class of 2-BB cross-monotonic methods has been constructed parameterized by n mappings fi : R+ → R+, one per
user. Any of these methods is clearly efﬁciently computable. These results extends previous ones in [30] concerning
the MST game.
1.2. Our contribution
We investigate the problem of sharing the cost of multicasting in wireless networks in both the general symmetric
case and the special Euclidean one, where stations are located in the d-dimensional Euclidean space.
In the general symmetric case, according to the model for multicasting in wired networks adopted in [19], we ﬁrst
consider the case in which the power assignments are induced by a ﬁxed universal spanning tree and we show that the
deriving cost function is non-decreasing and submodular, and thus the Shapley value yields a BB mechanism, while
the MC yields an efﬁcient one. Successively, as a universal spanning tree can induce a power assignment arbitrarily
more expensive than the optimal ones, in order to answer the natural question of guaranteeing communication with a
minimum total energy consumption,we focus on the determination of amechanism that distributes the cost of an optimal
power assignment. Motivated by the NP-hardness of the problem and by the impossibility of having polynomial-time
mechanisms satisfying -efﬁciency [43], by exploiting the notion of -BB condition [29] we provide a (3 ln(k+1))-BB
strategyproof cost sharing mechanism for general wireless networks, where k is the number of receivers.
When restricted to Euclidean wireless networks, we show that if  = 1 or d = 1 the optimal multicast cost
yields a non-decreasing submodular function. Therefore, the Shapley value gives rise to a 1-BB mechanism and the
MC to an efﬁcient one, again both efﬁciently computable. For  > 1 and d > 1 we show that optimal multicast
power assignments, that are NP-hard to compute [11], in general do not admit cross-monotonic cost sharing methods.
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Therefore, by extending the results in [21] concerning the approximation of the MST algorithm for broadcasting, we
prove that for d2 (i) the cost of a minimum Steiner tree connecting a source s to given set of receivers R is at
most 3d − 1 times the optimal one for multicasting to R and (ii) any Steiner tree connecting s to R induces a power
assignment that does not exceed its cost. Therefore, by exploiting the results in [29], we provide a class of 2(3d −1)-BB
cross-monotonic cost sharingmethods that can be determined in a polynomial running time and consequently efﬁciently
computable 2(3d − 1)-BB group strategyproof mechanisms for any d2. Moreover, for the case d = 2 the result
in [1] implies that our mechanisms are 12-BB.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section are presented the results obtained for symmetric wireless net-
works, and in Section 3 the ones obtained for Euclidean wireless networks. Finally, in Section 4 we address conclusions
and some open problems.
2. Cost sharing mechanisms for symmetric wireless networks
2.1. Mechanisms based on universal trees
Similar to the result for wired networks illustrated in Section 1.1.1 [19], we ﬁrst consider the power assignments
induced byuniversal broadcast trees in the cost graphG = (S, c), that is directed treesT (S\{s}) spanning all the stations
in S\{s}which allow broadcast communications from s. For any subset of receiversR ⊆ S\{s}, we obtain a directed tree
T (R) for multicasting toR by the union of all the directed paths in T (S\{s}) connecting s to the agents inR. The power
assignment R that implements the multicast tree T (R) is naturally deﬁned as R(xi) = max(xi ,xj )∈T (R) c(xi, xj ).
Lemma 2.1. The cost function C yielded by any universal tree T (S\{s}) is non-decreasing and submodular.
Proof. Clearly, C(∅) = 0 and for every Q ⊆ R, as T (Q) is contained in T (R), it must be C(Q)C(R). In order to
show that for any two subsets of receivers Q and R, C(Q ∪ R)C(Q) + C(R) − C(Q ∩ R) it sufﬁces to observe
that ∀Q,R ⊆ S\{s} and ∀xi ∈ S, both these conditions are met: (i) Q∪R(xi) = max{Q(xi),R(xi)}, and (ii)
Q∩R(xi) min{Q(xi),R(xi)}. Thus, as Q∪R(xi)+Q∩R(xi) max{Q(xi),R(xi)}+min{Q(xi),R(xi)}
= Q(xi) + R(xi), by summing over all the xi ∈ S, it follows that C is also submodular. 
As illustrated in Section 1.1, byLemma2.1 theMCmechanism is efﬁcient, strategyproof (but not group strategyproof)
and meets NPT, VP and CS [38]. Moreover, according to the results in [37,38], the Shapley value mechanism is group
strategyproof and satisﬁes BB, NPT, VP and CS.
It is worth while noticing that, as already remarked in Section 1.1, the Shapley value formula (4) in this case has a
quite simple and intuitive explanation: the transmission power of a station is distributed among the agents using it in the
multi-hop communication from the source in such a way that the portion of power used to reach the next-hop stations
of some receiving agents is equally distributed among such agents. That is, given a station x in T (R), if y1, . . . , yk are
the children of x in T (R) listed in non-decreasing order of cost from x (i.e., c(x, yi)c(x, yi+1) for i = 1, . . . , k−1),
then the power emission of x, that is R(x), is divided as follows: the portion of power c(x, yi) − c(x, yi−1) (where
c(x, y0) = 0), for 1 ik, is equally divided among the agents whose next hop station from x is one of the stations
from yi to yk .
The main drawback of the mechanisms just described is that a universal spanning tree can induce a power assignment
arbitrarily more expensive than the optimal one.
The problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms that meet efﬁciency, NPT, VP, CS and CO has been recently
also investigated by Penna and Ventre in [43]. By adapting the known VCG technique to this problem they showed that
it admits a polynomial-time strategyproof mechanism satisfying efﬁciency, NPT, VP, CS and CO based on polynomial-
time exact algorithms for maximizing the net worth. Motivated by the NP-hardness of the problem, they ﬁrst studied
the problem restricted to the special case of trees and provided a distributed algorithm which computes in polynomial
time the optimal net worth. Successively, they showed that a pre-computed shortest path tree in the cost graph can be
used as a (universal) tree in order to obtain a polynomial-time strategyproof mechanism which meets NPT, VP, CS
and O(n)-CO for general transmission graphs, but not O(n)-efﬁciency. Importantly, they prove that for any  > 0 no
polynomial-time algorithm can guarantee -efﬁciency, unless P = NP.
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2.2. An approximate BB mechanism for symmetric wireless networks
Ruled out the possibility of having polynomial-time mechanisms satisfying -efﬁciency, it remains to be explored the
possibility of deﬁning a -BB strategyproof mechanism for multicast transmissions in symmetric wireless networks.
In this work, we provide a positive result to this question by providing a 3 ln(k + 1)-BB strategyproof cost sharing
mechanism for multicast transmissions in such networks, where k is the number of receivers, which exploits the
reduction presented in [9] from MEMT to the NWST problem. Indeed, we ﬁrst prove a 1.5 ln k-BB strategyproof cost
sharing mechanism for the non-cooperative NWST, where k is the number of “terminals”. Then, as such a mechanism
only shares the cost of a weakly connected multicast tree, we show a second mechanism sharing the cost of the edges
added in order to make it a directed spanning tree rooted at s. Informally speaking, our mechanism consists of these
two mechanisms combined together.
We recall that NWST is deﬁned as follows: given an undirected nodeweighted graphH = (V ,E)with a non-negative
node weight function 	 : V → R+ and a set of k required terminals V ′ ⊆ V , 1 we wish to compute a minimum weight
Steiner tree spanning V ′. In Section 2.2.1, we recall the approximability results of MEMT which exploit the reduction
to NWST [9,28].
For a station xi , let ni denote the number of different transmission costs c(xi, xj ) (for j 	= i) in the edges incident
to xi and, for m = 1, . . . , ni , let Cmi be the mth smallest transmission cost. Finally, for the sake of simplicity, let us
assume that s = xn.
2.2.1. Approximating MEMT by exploiting a reduction to NWST
Let IMEMT = {G = (S, c), s, R} be an instance for MEMT deﬁned, as we know, by a cost graph G = (S, c), a
distinguished source station s ∈ S and a subset R ⊆ S\{s} of receivers. Then, the reduction to an instance INWST =
{H = (V ,E), 	, V ′} of NWST described in [9] works as follows:
• The set of nodes V is the union of |S| = n disjoint sets of nodes Zi called supernodes. Each supernode Zi is
composed of an input node Z0i and ni output nodes Z
j
i , for j = 1, . . . , ni .
• The set of edgesE contains an edge (Zmi , Z0j ) ifCmi c(xi, xj ). Also, for each station xi ,E contains an edge between
Z0i and each output node Z
j
i for j = 1, . . . , ni .
• The node weight function 	 is deﬁned as 	(Z0i ) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , n and 	(Zmi ) = Cmi for m = 1, . . . , ni .
• The set of terminals is deﬁned as V ′ = {Z0i | xi ∈ R ∪ {s}}.
Given a solution T [INWST] for INWST, we compute a breadth ﬁrst search (BFS) which starts from Z0n (i.e., the input
node corresponding to the source s) and number the nodes of the tree T [INWST] spanning V ′. Let n(Zmi ) be the BFS
number of Zmi . Then, we construct a directed spanning tree T [IMEMT] for IMEMT rooted at s = xn and spanning R in
this way: for each edge (Zmi , Z
m′
j ) such that n(Z
m
i ) < n(Z
m′
j ), the tree T [IMEMT] contains a directed edge 〈xi, xj 〉.
Finally, the output for IMEMT is the power assignment  deﬁned as (xi) = max〈xi ,xj 〉∈T [IMEMT] c(xi, xj ), if xi has at
least one outgoing edge in T [IMEMT], and (xi) = 0, otherwise.
Caragiannis et al. [9] proved that if T [INWST] is a  approximate solution to INWST, then  is a 2 approximate
solution to IMEMT. In other words, a reduction to NWST is used in order to compute a weakly connected 2 multicast
tree rooted at s. The solution is then made feasible by adding new edges to the multicast tree. The total cost of the
added edges is at most equal to the cost of the weakly connected tree.
The ﬁrst approximation algorithm for NWST, achieving an approximation ratio equal to 2 ln |k|, where k is the
number of terminals, is due to Klein and Ravi [33]. Their approach has been improved by Guha and Khuller in [28] by
designing a 1.35 ln |k| and a simpler 1.5 ln |k| approximation algorithm. Consequently, there exists a 2.7 ln(|R| + 1)
and a 3 ln(|R| + 1) approximation algorithm for MEMT. For technical reasons, that will be clear as soon as we will
have deﬁned our mechanism for NWST, the 1.35 ln |k|-approximation algorithm cannot be used as a substrate to
deﬁne our strategyproof cost sharing mechanism for the non-cooperative NWST, but we have to resort to the simpler
1.5 ln k-approximation.
1 Without loss of generality, we assume that terminals have degree one, since for each terminal t , we can create a new node t ′ with zero weight,
add the edge (t, t ′) and consider t ′ as the terminal.
2 We recall that a direct graph is weakly connected if the undirected graph obtained by making each directed edge undirected is connected.
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The 1.5 ln k-approximation algorithm AST for NWST : The 1.5 ln |k|-approximation algorithm is based on a decom-
position theorem showing that every solution can be decomposed into complex objects called branch-spiders. Before
recalling the algorithm, we introduce a few preliminary deﬁnitions [28]:
• A spider is a tree having at most one node of degree more than two. Such a node (if one exists) is called the center
of the spider. In particular, an m spider (m > 2) is a spider with a center of degree m and an m+ spider is one with
one node of degree at least m.
• A branch is a tree with at most three leaves. One of the leaves is called root.
• A branch-spider is constructed by merging the roots of a collection of branches into a single vertex, called the center.
A 3+ branch-spider is one with at least three terminals.
Given a spider Sp, the cost cost (Sp) of a spider is deﬁned as the sum of the weights of the nodes in the spider. Denoted
with TSp the set of terminals belonging to Sp, we deﬁne ratio(Sp) = cost(Sp)/|TSp|. Clearly, the leaves of a minimum
ratio spider are terminals.
Given an instance INWST = {H = (V ,E), 	, V ′} of NWST, the algorithm AST works iteratively, by repeatedly
“shrinking” the 3+ branch-spider with minimum ratio 3 until there are at most two terminals left, and then connect
them optimally. Shrinking a spider is the procedure of contracting all nodes of the spider and creating a new terminal
to denote the contracted spider.
2.2.2. A 1.5 ln k-BB strategyproof mechanism for NWST
We assume a non-cooperative scenario, where each node xi is a selﬁsh agent (a potential terminal) which has a
utility ui and may report a different utility value vi . In this section we propose a 1.5 ln k-BB strategyproof cost sharing
mechanism for non-cooperative NWST. Our mechanism uses the approximation algorithm for NWST described above
as a substrate to decide which terminals will be spanned in the computed solution and the cost share ci for each of
them.
With reference to the 1.5 ln k-approximation algorithm for NWST, we denote with NSp = TSp ∩ V the set of nodes
of the instance graph H = (V ,E) which are also terminals belonging to a spider Sp, while given a terminal t we
denote with N+t the set of terminals belonging to t , i.e., the set of terminals which have been shrunk to form t .
A key point is the following: given any initial reported utility proﬁle v, we need to iteratively associate a reported
utility vt to each new terminal t obtained by shrinking a spider Sp. To this aim, each such t is associated with a reported
utility vt equal to the minimum difference between a terminal’s reported utility and its cost share over all the terminals
belonging to the spider, multiplied by the number of terminals it contains, i.e., if ct ′ =∑xi∈N+t ′ ci :
vt = |TSp| · min
t ′∈TSp
{vt ′ − ct ′ }. (5)
The NWST mechanism:
Input: an instance INWST = {H = (V ,E), 	, V ′} of NWST and a reported utility proﬁle v.
Output: a set of terminals (called the receivers) R(v) ⊆ V ′, a Steiner tree T (v) spanning R(v) and the shared costs
ci(v) for all xi ∈ R(v).
Initialization: R(v) = ∅; T (v) = ∅; ci(v) = 0,∀xi ∈ V ′;
while R(v) 	= V ′ do
repeat the following steps until there are at most two terminals left and then connect them optimally
• ﬁnd a 3+ branch-spider Sp in H with minimum ratio;
• if ratio(Sp)vt for every t ∈ TSp, then
R(v) = R(v) ∪ NSp;
ci(v) = ratio(Sp), ∀xi ∈ NSp;
ci(v) = ci(v) + ratio(Sp)|N+t | , ∀xi ∈ N
+
t and ∀t ∈ TSp\NSp;
T (v) = T (v) ∪ Sp;
shrink Sp, update H and let t be the obtained terminal;
V ′ = V ′ ∪ {t};
set vt according to Eq. (5);
3 See [28] for the procedure for ﬁnding a minimum weight 3+ branch-spider.
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else for every t ∈ TSp such that ratio(Sp) > vt do
let X ⊆ V ′ be the set of terminals xi ∈ N+t s.t. vi − ci(v) < vt|N+t | ;
V ′ = V ′\X;
go to the Initialization step.
Let us denote by C(R(v)) the weight of the Steiner tree T (v) output by the mechanism (i.e., the global cost of the
solution) and by C∗(R(v)) the cost of the optimal Steiner tree T ∗(v) spanning R(v).
Theorem 2.2. The mechanism returns a Steiner tree T (v) such that C(R(v))(1.5 ln |R(v)|) · C∗(R(v)).
Proof. The claim follows directly by showing that the solution TA(R(v)) returned by the approximation algorithm
for the instance INWST = {H = (V ,E), 	, R(v)} coincides with T (v). To this aim suppose by contradiction that
this is not the case. Consider the ﬁrst spider Sp picked by the approximation algorithm. If the mechanism picks a
different spider Sp′, since the set of terminals is the same for both the algorithm and the mechanism, it must be that
ratio(Sp′) < ratio(Sp), a contradiction. Using an inductive argument, this implies that the set of terminals remains
the same at each step and that all the spiders picked by the algorithm are exactly the ones picked by the mechanism.
Hence, they return identical solutions. 
As the mechanism clearly meets cost recovery, previous theorem shows that the mechanism is 1.5 ln |R(v)|-BB.
It is quite easy to see that it runs in polynomial time and satisﬁes VP, NPT and CS.
In order to prove strategyproofness, it sufﬁces to prove that the cost charged to any receiver is independent from
its reported utility. To this aim, it is important to note that as far as the mechanism proceeds in its iterations, the cost
shares of the potential receivers are always increasing. Thus, if some node is discarded from the solution at some point,
it would have been essentially the same if it had been discarded from the beginning.
Theorem 2.3. The mechanism described above is a strategyproof.
Proof. First of all we stress that the mechanism does only comparisons on xi’s reported utility vi , thus the amount vi
determines only if xi belongs to R(v) or not, but not the structure of T (v) and thus the shared cost ci(v).
Consider the case in which vi < ui . If xi /∈ R(v) then wi = 0 and so xi’s welfare cannot decrease if xi reports the
true utility ui . If xi ∈ R(v) then, since the cost share of an agent is independent from its reported utility, again xi’s
welfare cannot decrease if xi reports the true utility ui .
Now consider the case in which vi > ui . If xi /∈ R(v) then wi = 0 and so xi’s welfare cannot decrease if xi reports
the true utility ui . If xi ∈ R(v) we have that ci(v)ui because of the VP property. Again, since the cost share of an
agent is independent from its reported utility, xi still belongs to the receivers’ set and its welfare cannot decrease if it
reports the true utility ui . 
Unfortunately, the mechanism is not group strategyproof as shown in the following example.
Consider the instance represented by the graph depicted in Fig. 1a and set V ′ = {1, 5, 6, 7}. Let us consider the
outcome of the cost sharing mechanism when the nodes report their true utilities u1 = u5 = u6 = 3, u7 = 32 .
It is easy to check that the ﬁrst spider chosen by the mechanism is one of the two minimum ratio spiders Sp2 and Sp3
depicted in Fig. 1b. Suppose that the mechanism chooses Sp2. Its ratio is equal to 1 and the set of spanned terminals
{1, 5, 7} can pay for the spider since min{u1, u5, u7} = 32 , then c1(u) = c5(u) = c7(u) = 1. After the shrinking of
Sp2 we are left only two terminals, the new one, say t , obtained from Sp2 having a reported utility vt = 32 and node 6,
and the mechanism connects them optimally by choosing the path 1 → 4 → 6 of ratio 32 . In fact, the set of connected
terminals {t, 6} can pay for the path since min{ut , u6} = 32 , then c1(u) = c5(u) = c7(u) = 32 and c6(u) = 32 . The
individual welfare of receivers is w1(u) = w5(u) = w6(u) = 32 and w7(u) = 0.
Now suppose that all the candidate receivers collude and so x7 reports a utility v7 = 32 −  	= u7, where 32 >  > 0.
As before, the mechanism chooses Sp2 and contracts it thus obtaining the new terminal t , but now the set {t, 6}
cannot pay for the path 1 → 4 → 6 of ratio 32 , since this time vt = 32 − 3. According to the mechanism u7 is
discarded from the set of potential receivers and the computation is restarted. It follows that at the next iteration the
mechanism chooses spider Sp1 also depicted in Fig. 1b. Its ratio is equal to 1+ /3 and x1, x5 and x6 can pay for it, thus
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Fig. 1. (a) An instance of the NWST for which the mechanism is not group strategyproof. (b) Three spiders Sp1, Sp2 and Sp3.
c1(v) = c5(v) = c6(v) = 1 + /3. After the shrinking of Sp1 all the terminals are connected, hence the mechanism
terminates. In this case, the individual welfare of the receivers is w1(v) = w5(v) = w6(v) = 2 − /3 and w7(v) = 0.
Since w7 remains the same and w1, w5 and w6 increase, the considered joined strategy dominates the one in which
they report their true utilities. Hence, the mechanism is not group strategyproof.
We now explain the reason why we do not use the (1.35 ln k)-approximation algorithm for NWST in deﬁning our
mechanism. This algorithm is based on a guessing of the optimal solution for the problem and for such a reason it must
be run a high (but still polynomial) number of times. Since cost sharing mechanisms have to construct dynamically
the set of the ﬁnal spanned terminals, an exponential number of guesses needs to be performed in order to achieve the
desired approximation ratio, thus making the mechanism unpractical.
We are now ready to present our cost sharing mechanism for multicast transmissions in symmetric wireless
networks.
2.2.3. A 3 ln(k + 1)-BB strategyproof mechanism for multicast transmissions in wireless networks
By using the reduction introduced in [9] and illustrated in Section 2.2.1, we can transform an instance IMEMT[R, v] =
{G = (S, c), s, R, v} for the MEMT in wireless networks spanning R ⊆ S\{s} with a utility proﬁle v, to an instance
INWST[V ′, v′] = {H = (V ,E), 	, V ′, v′} of NWST with a utility proﬁle v′ such that
• V ′ = {Z0i | xi ∈ R ∪ {s}}, i.e., each terminal (or receiver) is an input node Z0i associated with a receiver or the
source station.
• Denoted by v′i the reported utility associated with the terminal Z0i ∈ V ′, the related utility proﬁle v′ is obtained
from v by simply setting v′i = vi for all xi ∈ R and (under the assumption that s = xn) v′n = ∞.
We notice that, in order for the mechanism to work, it is necessary to modify slightly the one for the NWST so that
Z0n is considered as a terminal to be connected, but it is not taken into account in the cost sharing process. This means
that we do not have to consider Z0n as a terminal when computing the ratio of a spider and consequently when sharing
its cost.
The cost sharing mechanism for symmetric wireless networks:
Input: an instance IMEMT[S\{s}, v] = {G = (S, c), s, S\{s}, v} for the non-cooperativeMEMTinwireless networks
with a utility proﬁle v.
Output: The set R(v) of receiving stations, the power assignment R(v) and the cost shares ci(v), ∀xi ∈ R(v).
(1) R(v) = ∅; R′ = S\{s};
(2) reduce IMEMT[R′, v] to an instance INWST[V ′, v′] = {H = (V ,E), 	, V ′, v′} of NWST with a utility proﬁle v′
according to the method introduced above;
(3) while R′ 	= R(v) do
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(a) let TNWST[V ′, v′] be the Steiner tree computed by the mechanism for NWST spanning the selected receivers
R̂(v′) and ci(v′) be the cost share for each Z0i ∈ R̂(v′);
(b) let ′ be the power assignment inducing the Steiner tree TNWST[V ′, v′] and let  be the solution for MEMT
constructed starting from TNWST[V ′, v′], according to the reduction described in Section 2.2.1 which numbers
the nodes of the tree TNWST[V ′, v′] spanning V ′; by construction,  implements a directed tree rooted at s
spanning R(v) = {xi | xi 	= s ∧ Z0i ∈ R̂(v′)};
(c) following backward the enumeration of the receivers, for each xi ∈ S such that (xi) > ′(xi), let Ni be
the set of stations downstreaming from station xi according to . If minxj∈Ni {vj − cj (v)}(xi)/|Ni | then
cj (v) ← cj (v) + (xi)/|Ni |, ∀xj ∈ Ni , else let X ⊆ S\{s} be the set of stations such that vi − ci(v) <
(xi)/|Ni |. Set R(v) = R(v)\X, set R′ = R(v) and go to step (2).
Exploiting the same arguments used for the NWST mechanism, one can show that the above mechanism runs in
polynomial time, is strategyproof, (3 ln(|R(v)| + 1))-BB and meets NPT, VP and CS. Clearly, by suitably adapting the
instance depicted in Fig. 1a to wireless networks, it is possible to show that the mechanism is not group strategyproof.
3. Cost sharing mechanisms for Euclidean wireless networks
In this section we consider the restriction of the problem to the special case where the stations lay in a d-dimensional
Euclidean space. We ﬁrst address the case in which  = 1 or d = 1 in Section 3.1 and then consider the one in which
 > 1 and d > 1 in Section 3.2.
3.1. Optimal mechanisms for Euclidean networks
In order to show the existence of efﬁciently computable mechanisms that are either 1-BB or efﬁcient for the case
of Euclidean wireless networks, when  = 1 or d = 1, in this section we prove that for any subset of receivers R an
optimal power assignment of cost C∗(R) can be efﬁciently determined and that C∗ is a non-decreasing submodular
function. Hence, the Shapley value and the MC correspond to optimal mechanisms that can be computed in polynomial
time.
Lemma 3.1. If  = 1 or d = 1 then C∗ is a non-decreasing submodular function and a power assignment of cost
C∗(R) can be determined in polynomial time for any subset R ⊆ S\{s}.
Proof. If  = 1, the transmission cost associated with any pair of stations xi, xj is c(xi, xj ) = dist (xi, xj ) and the
cost paid for reaching the farthest station x ∈ R from s is at least dist (s, x), since stepping through intermediate
stations cannot cost less than going to x directly by a single hop. Therefore, the power assignment obtained by setting
w(s) = dist (s, x) and the powers of all the other stations equal to 0 has an optimal cost and allows a multicast from
s to all the stations in R, since all of them are at distance at most dist (s, x) from s. Clearly such a power assignment
can be determined in polynomial time. Moreover, C∗ is non-decreasing and submodular since trivially C∗(∅) = 0,
C∗(Q)C∗(R) ifQ ⊆ R and for any two subsets of receiversR andQ the inequalityC∗(R∪Q)C∗(R)+C∗(Q)−
C∗(R ∩ Q) holds, because C∗(R ∪ Q) = max{C∗(R), C∗(Q)} and C∗(R ∩ Q) min{C∗(R), C∗(Q)}.
When d = 1, all the stations lay on a line. Let x1, . . . , xn be the stations of S ordered according to their occurrence
along the line, i.e., x1 < x2 < · · · < xn and let s = xk be the source. Moreover, let us denote by xfR (resp., xlR ) the
ﬁrst (resp., last) station of any subset R ∪ {s} ⊆ S along the line, for any R ⊆ S, and by xf (resp., xl ) the farthest
station x before (resp., after) s in the line directly reachable from s (i.e., such that (s) · dist (s, x)), given any
power assignment .
Without loss of generality, let us consider each subset R ⊆ S as the minimal interval [xfR , xlR ] along the line
including R ∪ {s}.
Since 1, it can be easily checked that for any power assignment  multicasting to R, the power assignment R
to the stations such that
R(xj ) =
⎧⎨
⎩
(s) ifj = k (i.e., xj = s),
dist (xj , xj+1) if lj < lR,
dist (xj , xj−1) if fR < jf
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satisﬁes the inequality cost (R)cost (). In fact, the overall power consumption can be only reduced by maximizing
the number of hops before xf and after xl .
Therefore, a power assignment ∗R of minimum cost C∗(R) = cost (∗R) can be determined in polynomial time
trying the at most n possible choices for the power emission of s and then completing as described above for reaching
all the stations.
Again we prove that C∗ is non-decreasing and submodular. Clearly, C∗(∅) = 0 and C∗(Q)C∗(R) if Q ⊆ R.
We only need to prove that C∗(R ∪ Q)C∗(R) + C∗(Q) − C∗(R ∩ Q) (see inequality (2)).
Let ∗Q and ∗R be the optimal power assignments for multicasting to Q and R, respectively. Let us consider: (a) the
(eventually not optimal) power assignment R∪Q for R ∪Q obtained by letting R∪Q(s) = max {∗R(s),∗Q(s)} and
then completing in the described way; (b) the power assignment R∩Q for R ∩Q obtained by completing as above the
power assignment R∩Q(s) = min {∗R(s),∗Q(s)} to the source s.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that ∗R(s)∗Q(s). Hence, we have
C∗(R ∪ Q)cost (R∪Q) = C∗(Q) + f (R ∪ Q,Q) + l(Q,R ∪ Q),
C∗(R ∩ Q)cost (R∩Q) = C∗(R) − f (R,R ∩ Q) − l(R ∩ Q,R),
where for any subsets X, Y : f (X, Y ) =∑fX<jfY dist (xj , xj−1) and l(X, Y ) =∑lX<j lY dist (xj , xj−1).
Since inequality (2) is trivially satisﬁed if Q ⊆ R, we only focus on any two subsets Q and R such that neither
[xfQ, xlQ ] 	⊆ [xfR , xlR ] nor [xfR , xlR ] 	⊆ [xfQ, xlQ ]. Since by assumption the source s belongs to each interval, clearly
the following cases sufﬁce to conclude the proof:
• Let xfQ < xfRxlQ < xlR . Since R ∪ Q = [xfQ, xlR ] and R ∩ Q = [xfR , xlQ ], it is f (R ∪ Q,Q) = f
(R,R ∩ Q) = 0 and l(Q,R ∪ Q) = l(R ∩ Q,R). This completes the proof of the lemma.
• Let xfR < xfQxlR < xlQ . SinceR∪Q = [xfR , xlQ ] andR∩Q = [xfQ, xlR ], it isf (R∪Q,Q) = f (R,R∩Q)
and l(Q,R ∪ Q) = l(R ∩ Q,R) = 0. This completes the proof of the lemma. 
As illustrated in Section 1.1, by Lemma 3.1, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2. If  = 1 or d = 1 then the Shapley value provides an efﬁciently computable optimally BB mechanism
meeting NPT, VP, CS and the group strategyproofness. Moreover, the MC can be computed in polynomial time and
provides an efﬁcient mechanism meeting NPT, VP, CS and the group strategyproofness.
Proof. By the above discussion it remains to show only that the MC mechanism can be computed in polynomial time
both when  = 1 and d = 1.
In the ﬁrst case, the cost of an optimal power assignment for multicasting to a subset of receivers R is determined
only by the station having maximum distance from the source. Thus, including all the intermediate stations does not
increase the cost of the assignment and on the contrary can only improve the sum of the utilities of all the receiving
agents. As a consequence, there are at most n − 1 possibilities for determining the largest efﬁcient set, each obtained
by choosing a station and including it with all the ones closer to the source in the set.
Analogously, when d = 1, that is all the stations belong to a line, the cost of an optimal power assi-
gnment is determined only by the ﬁrst and the last receiving station along the line. Therefore, again including all the
intermediate stations can only increase the efﬁciency and thus the largest efﬁcient set is one of the at most n2 sub-
sets obtained by choosing the ﬁrst and the last station and including them with all the intermediate ones in
the set.
In both cases, since the optimal power assignments and thus the costs assigned to agents can be determined in
polynomial time, the MC mechanism is efﬁciently computable. 
3.2. -BB mechanisms for Euclidean networks
Starting from the results shown in the previous section, we now concentrate on the Euclidean case in which  > 1
and d > 1.
Unfortunately, under these assumptions the problem in general is NP-hard [11], so that polynomial-time BB-
mechanisms are unlikely to exist. Worse than that, even if polynomial-time solvability is not a concern, the following
lemma concerning the optimal cost function C∗ shows that no cross-monotonic cost sharing method in general exists
for  > 1 and d > 1 (and thus also the Shapley value is not cross-monotonic). Recalling the remarks on the core set
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Fig. 2. An instance of the wireless multicast problem yielding an empty core.
in Section 1.1, as a further implication, C∗ is not submodular. Hence, the emptiness of the core prevents from using
cross-monotonic cost sharing methods to achieve BB group strategyproof mechanisms.
Lemma 3.3. For any  > 1 and d > 1 there exist instances of the wireless multicast problem for which core(C∗) is
empty.
Proof. We prove the lemma by providing a suitable instance of the problem yielding an empty core. The instance is
constructed as follows. For a suitably large integer m, ﬁve external stations x0, . . . , x4 are placed along the border of
a circle of radius m centered at the source s in correspondence of the corners of a pentagon, and another ﬁve internal
stations y0, . . . , y4 on the corners of a smaller pentagon of radius m/2, rotated in such a way that each is equidistant
from the two external stations placed in the two closest adjacent corners of the external pentagon (see Fig. 2). Lines of
crossing stations at distance one corresponding to the dotted lines in Fig. 2 connect the source to all such stations, and
all the internal stations to the two closest external ones.
Since  > 1, for m suitably large, in any optimal power assignment for multicasting to any subset of stations only
the source and the ﬁve internal stations can have power assignments greater than 1. Moreover, as m increases, their
contribution to the total cost becomes negligible with respect to the one yielded by the crossing stations, so that it can
be ignored without affecting the correctness of the proof.
Let R be the subset of the ﬁve external stations. Then, for m suitably large, an optimal power assignment for
multicasting to R corresponds to the one depicted with dashed lines in Fig. 2 in which two pairs of adjacent external
stations are reached through the internal closest one, and one directly with a straight line. Clearly such a solution saves
energywith respect to the one inwhich all the external stations are reached by straight lines, so thatC∗({xj }) > C∗(R)/5
for every xj .Moreover, the optimal power assignment formulticasting to any two adjacent external stations goes through
the closest internal station, so that C∗({x0, x1}) + C∗({x2, x3}) + C∗({x4}) = C∗(R) and thus C∗({x0, x1}) <
2C∗(R)/5 since C∗({x0, x1}) = C∗({x2, x3}) and C∗({x4}) > C∗(R)/5.
Assume then by contradiction that there exists a core function f0 for R. Then by symmetry, all the functions
fi with 1 i4 such that fi(xj ) = f (xj+i mod 5) belong to the core, and since the core set is convex, that is the
convex combination of core functions belonging to the core still belongs to the core, the function f such that f (xj ) =
(f0(xj )+· · ·+f4(xj ))/5 belongs to the core and assigns the same allocation costC∗(R)/5 to all the stations. Therefore,
f (x0) + f (x1) = 2C∗(R)/5 > C∗({x0, x1}): a contradiction, since f belongs to the core. 
Motivated by the above discussion, we now focus on the determination of approximate BB mechanisms. The
fundamental observation leading to our mechanisms is that a Steiner tree in the cost graph G = (S, c,) connecting
s and the stations in R induces a power assignment for multicasting to R not exceeding its cost and that the cost of
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a minimum Steiner tree is close to the cost of an optimal power assignment for R. Thus, by applying the method of
Jain and Vazirani [29], it is possible to ﬁnd Steiner trees inducing a parametric family of cross-monotonic methods
with a good approximation. The Steiner heuristic is very simple and consists, once determined a Steiner tree T in the
cost graph connecting s and the stations in R, in orienting all the edges of T downwards and setting the powers of
the internal stations so as to implement T , that is in such a way that each xi in T has a power emission equal to the
maximal cost of a descending incident edge. Clearly, denoted as cost (T ) the cost of the T , such a power assignment
 is such that cost ()cost (T ).
The following lemma is due to [21].
Lemma 3.4. Let Q ⊆ S be a subset of stations and G(Q) = (Q, c,) be the cost graph induced by Q. Then, for any
d, if there exists xi ∈ Q such that dist (xi, xj )c for every other station xj ∈ Q, a minimum spanning tree T of
G(Q) has cost cost (T )(3d − 1)c.
It is then possible to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3.5. Given a subset of receivers R, let T be a minimum Steiner tree in G = (S, c,) connecting s and all the
stations in R. Then, for any d , cost (T )(3d − 1)C∗(R).
Proof. Consider an optimal power assignment ∗R and let x1, . . . , xk be the stations with strictly positive powers
according to ∗R . Then, if Qi is the subset of all the stations falling within the range of xi , xi included, i.e., Qi = {x ∈
S | ∗R(xi) · dist (x, xi)}, for every i, 1 ik, by applying Lemma 3.4 the cost of a minimum spanning tree Ti of
G(Qi) is such that cost (Ti)(3d − 1)∗R(xi). The union of all the Ti’s for the different values of i yields a subgraph
GR ofG = (S, c,) connecting s and all the stations inR of cost cost (GR)∑ki=1 (3d −1)∗R(xi) = (3d −1)C∗(R),
and the lemma then follows by observing that the cost of a minimum Steiner tree T connecting s and the stations in R
is at most cost (GR). 
Clearly, if a tree T is an -approximation of a minimum Steiner tree connecting s and a subset of stations R, as a
corollary of Lemma 3.5 it follows that the power assignment yielded by T corresponds to a (3d − 1)-approximation
of an optimal power assignment for multicasting to R. Then, by exploiting the family of the 2-BB cost sharing methods
for the Steiner tree problems presented in [29], it is possible to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3.6. For every d there exists a family of efﬁciently computable 2(3d − 1)-BB group strategyproof mech-
anisms for the wireless multicast problem in any d-dimensional Euclidean space.
Proof. As shown in [29], for any weighted graph G and for any subset of nodes R in G, it is possible to ﬁnd a
Steiner tree TR connecting a given source s to the nodes in R that corresponds to a 2-approximation of the mini-
mum Steiner tree and satisfying the further property that there exists a family F of cross-monotonic sharing meth-
ods such that, for any  ∈ F , ∑xi∈R (R, xi) = cost (TR), so that  corresponds to a 2-BB cost sharing method.
Starting from F , a 2(3d − 1)-BB cross-monotonic cost sharing method for the multicast problem in wireless net-
works can be obtained from any  ∈ F as follows. For any subset of receivers R, let TR be a 2-approximation of
the minimum Steiner connecting s and R in the cost graph G = (S, c,), and let  be one of the corresponding
cost sharing methods in F . Then,  is also a 2(3d − 1)-BB cross-monotonic cost sharing method for the multi-
cast problem in wireless networks. In fact, denoted as R the power assignment for R determined according to
the Steiner heuristic applied on TR , it results that
∑
xi∈R (R, xi) = cost (TR)cost (R) and
∑
xi∈R (R, xi) =
cost (TR)2(3d − 1)C∗(R). The theorem then follows directly from [29] by observing that  can be computed in
polynomial time. 
For the special case d = 2 the result in Lemma 3.4 has been improved to the value 6 in [1]. Then, by applying the
same arguments of Lemma 3.5 and Theorem 3.6, it is possible to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3.7. For every 2 there exists a family of efﬁciently computable 12-BB group strategyproof mechanisms
for the wireless multicast problem on the two-dimensional Euclidean space.
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4. Conclusions
In this paper, we provided suitably strategyproof and group strategyproofmechanisms for sharing the cost ofmulticast
transmission services in symmetric wireless networks, both in the general and Euclidean model.
By the time the preliminary version of this paper appeared in the Proceedings of the 16th Annual ACM Symposium
on Parallel Algorithms (SPAA 2004), the Euclidean mechanisms for d2 has been improved in [43] by apply-
ing the new extended Moulin–Shenker approach based on the notion of self-cross-monotonic cost sharing method
(see Section 1.1).
Interesting left open questions are the determination of cost sharing mechanisms for Euclidean wireless networks
approximating the maximum efﬁciency for d > 1 and the budget balance for  < d. To this aim, we observe that
unfortunately the Steiner tree heuristic does not help, as in general it does not provide a good approximation [11].
It would be also nice to ﬁnd the lowest approximation ratio that can be achieved by a BB cost sharing mechanism,
even if not computable in polynomial time.
Another worth investigating issue is the determination of group strategyproof cost sharing mechanism for the general
case.
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